Abstract
Introduction
Nowadays, mobile devices (i.e., smart phones, PDAs) are widely used in many mobile applications, such as online shopping, mobile pay-TV, and electronic transactions. Along with the increasing number of mobile applications, the security issues have been received more and more attention. Authenticated key exchange (AKE) [1] is one of the most important cryptographic components which is used for establishing an authenticated and confidential communication channel between communicating participants. Generally, the user must be authenticated by the remote server before he accesses the services provided by the remote servers. The password-based authentication scheme [2] [3] [7] [8] [9] [10] is one of widely used AKE mechanisms to verify the validity of the remote users over an insecure communication channel, and is a protective barrier that can prevent unauthorized personnel from accessing services provided by the application server. Recently many researchers achieve AKE in the multi-server environment called multi-server authenticated key agreement (MSAKA) protocols [6, 8, 10, 12] . MSAKA protocols allow the user to register at the registration center (RC) once and can access all the permitted services provided by the eligible servers.
In 2001, Li et al., [9] proposed a remote password authentication scheme for multiserver environments. In Li et al., the password authentication system is a pattern classification system based on an artificial neural network. Therefore, their scheme needs long time to train neural networks. Then, Lin et al., [23] proposed an improved authentication scheme based on ElGamal digital signature. Juang [6] proposed a new multi-server password authentication protocol using the hash function and symmetric key cryptosystem. However, Chang and Lee [14] pointed out that Juang's protocol lacks efficiency and is vulnerable to off-line dictionary attack. Therefore, Chang and Lee
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic concepts of Chebyshev chaotic map [21] and its related mathematical properties. And then, the basic concepts of one-way hash function and Symmetric encryption are described. In the end of this section, the security requirements about a secure and efficient authentication scheme are given.
Chebyshev Chaotic Map
Let n be an integer and x be a variable with the interval [-1, 1]. The Chebyshev polynomial T n (x): [-1, 1] → [-1, 1] is defined as T n (x) = cos(n arccos(x)), Chebyshev polynomial map Tn: R → R of degree n is defined by the following recurrent relation:
where n ≥ 2, T 0 (x) = 1 and T1(x) = x. The first few Chebyshev polynomials are as follows. T 2 (x) = 2x 2 -1, T 3 (x) = 4x 3 -3x, T 4 (x) = 8x 4 -8x 2 + 1, … One of the most important properties of Chebyshev polynomials is so-called semigroup property which establishes that
An immediate consequence of this property is that Chebyshev polynomials commute under composition
In order to improve the security of Chebyshev polynomials, Zhang [] proved that semi-group property holds for Chebyshev polynomials defined on interval (-∞, +∞).
The enhanced Chebyshev polynomials are expressed in the form.
where n ≥ 2, x ∈ (-∞, +∞), and N is a large prime number. Obviously,
Computational Problems
To prove the security of our proposed protocol, we present some important mathematical properties of Chebyshev chaotic map as follows.
2) Chaotic Maps-based Discrete Logarithm Problem (CMBDLP): Given x and y, it is intractable to find the integer s, such that T s (x) = y.
3) Chaotic Maps-based Diffie-Hellman Problem (CMBDHP): Given x, T r (x) and T s (x), it is intractable to find T rs (x).
One-way Hash Function
One-way hash function [8] is an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, and it is easy to compute on every input but hard to compute the input from a given output. Here "easy" and "hard" are to be understood in the sense of computational complexity theory. A secure cryptographic one-way hash function has the following properties.
For any given input x, it is easy to compute the output. 1)·It is infeasible to deriving x from the given value y = h(x).
2)·It is infeasible to find two different inputs with the same output.
3)·It is infeasible to modify an input without changing the output.
Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme E(Kgen, E, D) consists of three algorithms as follow.
1) Randomized key generation algorithm Kgen: it returns a key k drawn from the key pool Keys(E k ) randomly.
2) Encryption algorithm E: it makes the key k ∈ Keys(E k ) and a plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} * as the input and a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} * as its output. And it can be written C = E k (M).
3) Decryption algorithm D: it takes the key k and a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} * as the input and outputs a plaintex M ∈ {0, 1} * , it can be written M = D k (C).
Security Requirements
In general, a secure and efficient remote user authentication scheme should satisfy the following requirements.
The Proposed One-Way Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme
In this section, a Chebyshev chaotic maps-based one-way authentication and key agreement scheme is proposed. Without loss of generality, the proposed authentication scheme consists of two phases: the registration phase and the authentication and session key agreement phase. For the sake of clarity, the notations used in this paper are summarized and defined in Table 1 .
Table 1. List of Notations
The ith server，the identity of the ith server, respectively a, r i Nonce used in this paper
Public key based on Chebyshev chaotic maps k Secret key based on Chebyshev chaotic maps 
Server Registration Phase
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the multi-server environment includes three kinds of participants: a trusted registration center (RC), users and servers. In addition, it is assumed that the servers can register at the registration center via secure communication channel. The detailed server registration phase steps are performed as follows.
Step R1. When a server S i or an authenticated expert wants to be a new legal service provider, it must choose its identity ID Si with its identification card. Then the server submits the identity ID Si to the RC via a secure channel.
Step R2. Upon receiving from the server ID Si or an authenticated expert, the RC computes R = H(ID Si || k), where k is the secret key of RC. Then the RC returns the value R to the server or the authenticated expert via a secure channel.
The server registration phase are depicted in Figure 1 .
International 
One-way Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
In this phase, the server or the RC can be authenticated by the other two communication entities, but the user cannot be authenticated by the server or the RC. By this way, the user can be maintained his/her anonymity in the multi-server architecture. The concrete process is presented in Figure 2 .
Step A1. When a user U j (assume U j as an anonymous user) wants to consult some personal issues from S i (or an expert) in a secure way, he/she will choose a random integer number a and a temporary session SID A . Then
, C 1 } to the server Si where she/he wants to obtain the service.
Step A2. Upon receiving the message m 1 = {SID A , T a (x), C 1 }, S i will do the following tasks to ask RC to authenticate itself: S i selects a random number r i and computes T ri (x), C 2 = H(ID Si || m 1 || R || T ri (x)). Then, S i sends the message m 2 = {ID Si , T ri (x), C 2 , m 1 } to RC.
Step A3. Next, RC will help the user U j to authenticate the legality of the server S i and verify the temporary information by helping them to compute the session key.
Upon receiving the message m 2 = {ID Si , T ri (x), C 2 , m 1 }, RC needs to proceed as follows.
1) Authenticating the legality of the server S i . Based on the server's identity ID Si , RC computes R' = H(ID Si || k). Then, RC computes C 2 ' = H(ID Si || m 1 || R' || T ri (x)) and checks whether C 2 ' = C 2 . If they are equal, RC believes that the server S i is a legal sever.
2) Confirm S i is the right server which the user U j wants to communicate with: RC computes K RC-A = T k T a (x) and then decrypts C 1 to obtain the values SID A || ID Si || H A . Then, RC caculates H A ' = H(SID A || ID Si || T a (x)) and checks whether H A ' = H A . If they are equal and ID Si is the same as the value extract from C 1 , that means S i is the server that the user U j wants to communicate with.
3) Assisting the server S i and the user U j to generate the session key: RC computes
. Then, RC sends the message {ID RC , C 4 } to the user U j and sends the message {ID RC , C 3 } to the server S i .
If any of above authentication process cannot be established, the authenticate scheme will be terminated immediately.
Step A4. For the user U j : After receiving the message {ID RC , C 4 }, the user U j computes the key K A-RC and then uses the key to decrypt C 4 . Next, U j computes H RC ' = H(SID A || ID Si || ID RC || T ri (x)) and checks whether H RC ' = H RC . If they are equal, the user U j computes the session key SK = T a T ri (x).
For the server S i : After receiving the message {ID RC , C 3 }, S i computes C 3 ' = H(ID RC || ID Si || m 1 || R || T ri (x)) and checks whether C 3 ' = C 3 . If they are equal, the server S i computes the session key SK = T ri T a (x). 
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed authentication and key agreement scheme. We consider the assumptions and threat model presented in Section 2 and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the following attacks.
Corollary 1. The Proposed Authentication can Resist Impersonation Attack
Proof: In the proposed scheme, any adversary cannot impersonate anyone of the server S i and the RC. The proposed authentication scheme has already authenticated each other between the server S i and the RC, and the user U j authenticates S i and RC based on the secrets k, R and the nonce a and ri. Therefore, there is no way for an adversary to have a chance to carry out impersonation attack.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme and compare it with other related authentication schemes. It is generally known that most of the mobile devices have limited power resources and computing capability. Therefore, one of the most important concerns of design authentication scheme in mobile environment is power consumption (include computation cost and communication cost). Compared to RSA and ECC, Chebyshev polynomial computation problem offers smaller key sizes, faster computation. In our proposed authentication scheme, there is no time-consuming modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication on elliptic curves needed. Since exclusive-OR operation requires extremely small computational cost, we neglect its computation cost.
For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost, we define some notations as follows.
T h : The time for executing the hash function.
T sym : The time for executing a symmetric key cryptography. T exp : The time for executing a modular exponentiation computation. T CH : The time for executing the Tn(x) mod p in Chebyshev polynomial using the algorithm in [21] .
In Table 2 , we demonstrate the comparisons between our proposed scheme and the previously authentication schemes. The scheme in [17] consumes more computations than our proposed scheme. The schemes in [5] own high-efficiency, but from the security point of view, they cannot resist some common attacks and cannot provide some common functionality such as session key secrecy. Therefore, we can draw a conclusion that our proposed scheme is more suitable for the mobile client server environments. 
Conclusion
This paper provides a novel approach to design one-way authenticated key establishment towards multi-server architecture. The core concept of the proposed authentication scheme is establishing the mutual authentication for the servers and RC and the anonymity for the users. Subsequently, we explain the practical motivations for authentication and secrecy assurances of parties engaging in one-way AKE protocols and
